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This paper examines the impact on old age poverty and the fiscal cost of universal minimum old age 
pensions in Latin America using recent household survey data for 18 countries. Alleviating old age 
poverty requires different approach from other age groups and a minimum pension is likely to be the 
only alternative available. First we measure old age poverty rates for all countries. Second we discuss 
the design of minimum pensions schemes, means-tested or not, as well as the disincentive effects that 
they are expected to have on the economic and social behavior of households including labor supply, 
saving and family solidarity. Third we use the household surveys to simulate the fiscal cost and the 
impact on poverty rates of alternative minimum pension schemes in the 18 countries. We show that a 
universal  minimum  pension  would  substantially  reduce  poverty  among  the  elderly  except  in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay where minimum pension systems already exist and poverty 
rates are low. Such schemes have much to be commended in terms of incentives, spillover effects and 
administrative simplicity but have a high fiscal cost.  The latter is a function of the age at which 
benefits  are  awarded,  the  prevailing  longevity,  the  generosity  of  benefits,  the  efficacy  of  means 
testing, and naturally the fiscal capacity of the country. 
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Introduction 
 
Alleviating  old-age  poverty  requires  different  approach  from  other  age  groups.  Since 
policies that go through labor and output markets and educational and training programs 
are ineffective, the only available instrument to alleviate old age poverty is a transfer of 
real  income  (possibly  through  price  subsidies).  In  most  developed  countries,  pension 
systems—which  generally  consist  of  a  balanced  combination  of  pay-as-you-go  and 
funded  schemes—include  minimum  pension  schemes  and  are  strongly  redistributive, 
yielding  a  sizeable  difference  between  poverty  rates  before  and  after  transfer.
2    By 
contrast, in developing countries with pension systems, one observes that they have a 
limited potential to solve old-age poverty because of the low coverage of those systems.  
Coverage rates are below 30% in half Latin American countries. They range from around 
10 % of the labor force in Peru and Bolivia to about 60 % in Chile. These figures are for 
2006  and  are  based  on  the  number  of  contributors  (Mesa-Lago  2004,  Rofman  et  al. 
2008).  As  to  the  coverage  of  the  elderly,  the  rates  are  extremely  low  in  most  Latin 
American countries. They range from 5% in Honduras to 85% in Uruguay. They are 
about or higher than 60 % in the traditional four, Argentina, Brasil, Chile and Uruguay 
(ABCU, hereafter) plus Costa Rica and Bolivia. 
More efficient solution consists of lump-sum transfers financed by tax receipts. These are 
pensions aimed at providing a replacement income to old persons under the poverty line 
and are of two types (Willmore 2001; see also Holzmann et al. 2009).
3  The first type of 
                                                 
2 Public old age pension systems are generally considered to have two objectives: income replacement and 
poverty prevention. Contributory schemes (also called earnings-related or insurance-based schemes) are 
used for the first objective. To fulfill the second objective, one relies on noncontributory schemes providing 
minimum rate benefits (also called social pension). Both separation and combination of these objectives 
have  merits.  By  separating  the  two  functions,  one  hopes  that  the  only  distortions  will  arise  from  the 
redistributive pillar and that the contributory pillar will carry no deadweight loss. By combining them, it is 
hoped that workers will perceive the contributions they have to pay as an insurance premium and not as a 
tax. How payroll taxes are perceived is an open and unresolved question (See on this point, Schokkaert et 
al. 2003 and Gill et al. 2005). Another advantage of merging the two functions is to make the whole system 
more  politically  sustainable.  This  view  prevails  in  Continental  European  countries  which  follow  the 
Bismarckian tradition (Casamatta et al. 2001). Empirically and theoretically, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between the generosity of a pension system and its contributory nature. 
 
3 It should be noted that reduced contributory pensions are also called “minimum pension schemes.”  These 
are aimed at workers who have had some work career but could not accumulate enough pension rights to   3 
minimum  pension  covers  unconditionally  all  the  elderly.  Benefits  are  the  same  for 
everyone regardless of income, assets or work history. This distinguishes it from means-
tested pensions which do not provide benefits (or provides reduced benefits) to those who 
have  other  income  or  assets,  and  from  the  minimum  pension  guarantee  for  which 
beneficiaries must have a history of contributions. In the OECD, only one country (New 
Zealand) provides a universal pension to its aged population with the objective to lift old 
persons above the poverty line. In low and middle income countries, only four countries 
have such universal minimum pension arrangements: Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana and 
Bolivia. (On Mauritius, see Willmore 2003). They are easy to administer and do not 
require information on the income of assets of the beneficiaries. They offer a pension 
which is relatively low and, with the exception of Mauritius, not high enough to lift its 
beneficiaries above the poverty line.  
 
The second type of minimum pension is also universal but subject to means-testing. This 
welfare pension can be completed by housing subsidy or the possibility of being admitted 
in a public nursing home.
4  A number of developing countries have universal means-
tested schemes although the means test applies to the household and not to the individual. 
The  most  famous  examples  are  rural  Brazil  and  South  Africa.    The  South  African 
minimum  pension  is  quite  generous  in  terms  of  level  (about  one-third  of  per  capita 
income) and the number of beneficiaries is high reaching 88% of the covered population.  
The pension is paid to men aged 65 and women aged 60 and over. It is funded through 
general taxation. The Brazilian minimum pension, for which the eligibility age is 60 for 
men and 55 for women, corresponds to the minimum wage (Iwakami et al. 2004). It is 
also worth mentioning Mexico City (Federal District) and its program of transfers for 
food expenses to the elderly living in  poor areas. A few studies examine the incidence of 
minimum pension schemes. Barrientos (2003a) studies the effect of social pensions on 
the poverty rate of elderly people in rural Brazil and South Africa and computes poverty 
rates and poverty gaps with and without means-tested minimum pension. He shows that. 
                                                                                                                                                 
reach a certain minimum level. These workers are entitled to a minimum pension that is not subject to any 
condition, except age condition and sometimes family structure.  
 
4  There is also an age condition and, in some cases, conditions of citizenship or legal residency.   4 
in both countries. the non-contributory pension reduces both the rate of poverty and the 
poverty gap. Rivera-Marques, Morris, Wodon and Siaens (2004) study the incidence of 
Mexico City’s safety net for the elderly and show that the program reduces poverty and 
inequality but that its performance in terms of poverty reduction is weaker as soon as the 
eligibility rules are relaxed (no means test and extension to non-poor areas). Other recent 
analyses of universal means-tested pension schemes (which are discussed below) include 
Carvalho 2001; Bertrand. Mullainathan and Miller 2003; and Duflo 2003. 
 
In Latin America, five countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay—
have non-contributory pensions (Bertranou, Solorio and van Ginneken 2002 and 2004). 
These programs generally have a social assistance character. in that they are targeted at  
 
Table 1 - Pension Policies in Latin American Countries 




rate of the 





rate of the 
elderly 
Argentina  mixed  24  1994  75 
Bolivia  private  11  1997  90 
Brazil  public  ..  -  85 
Chile  private  58  1981  80 
Colombia  pub/priv  24  1994  25 
CostaRica  mixed  48  2001  60 
Dom Rep  private  ..  2003  10 
Ecuador  mixed  21  2004  31 
Salvador  private  19  1998  15 
Guatemala  public  ..  -  15 
Honduras  public  ..  -  5 
Mexico  private  30  1997  20 
Nicaragua  private  16  2004  - 
Panama  public  ..  -  40 
Paraguay  public  ..  -  15   5 
Peru  pub/priv  11  1993  25 
Uruguay  mixed  60  1996  85 
Venezuela  public  ..  -  30 
sources  Mesa-Lago (2004)  and Rofman et al. (2008) for last column 
 
the poor and disabled who have no contributory capacity. In Brazil and Costa Rica, part 
of  the  social  assistance  pension  benefits  is  financed  by  cross-subsidies  from  social 
insurance  programs.  In  terms  of  coverage,  Chile,  Uruguay  and  Costa  Rica  offer  the 
greatest coverage but, in absolute terms, Brazil has a social assistance program with more 
than 2 million beneficiaries and, if the rural pensions program is included, the number of 
beneficiaries exceeds 8 million. See table 1. Even with high rate of coverage poverty will 
only  be  eradicated  if  benefits  are  high  enough  and  the  family  structure  is  not  too 
burdensome. 
 
Evidence on Poverty in Old Age   
At the international level, surprisingly little evidence is available on poverty in old age.  
For example, in its statistical publications, the World Bank does not report poverty rates 
for all age groups (World Bank 2005). Data on child poverty are published separately but 
not  data  on  poverty  in  old  age.  Only  recently  have  there  been  efforts  to  publish 
internationally comparable indicators of welfare from an age-specific perspective for rich 
and poor countries (see for example HelpAge International 2004; Kakwani, Schwartz and 
Subbarao 2004).  
In developed countries, the old age poverty rates are generally not much lower than those 
for the total population but this is a relatively recent trend.  A few decades ago, the 
average income of the elderly was substantially lower than that of other age groups and 
their rate of poverty much higher (Förster, Fuchs and Makovec 2003).  In developing 
countries, patterns are different and there is no obvious trend. As far as Latin America is 
concerned, the poverty headcount for the elderly is clearly lower than for the population 
average in the cases of ABCU and to a lesser extent in Nicaragua and Panama. It is 
higher in the other  countries as shown in figure 1 below. These four countries Argentina,   6 
Brasil, Chile and Uruguay, which are among the richest in our sample, will often behave 
differently from the rest. 
Poverty in old age can still be observed even in countries—for instance in the OECD—
that have generous transfers for the elderly including targeted minimum pensions.  This 
seems puzzling at first sight since the pension is universal and its level is above the 
poverty line (generally half the median income). There are at least three reasons for this 
apparent  puzzle:  family  composition  (if  the  other  family  members  do  not  have  any 
resource. the equivalent income of each member can be below the poverty line); take-up 
issue (when the pension is means-tested some individuals can be reluctant to claim it) and 
finally, given that it is subject to a means-test, some elderly people prefer to keep their 
assets even if these assets don’t generate much income. 
 
Old Age Poverty Rates under Current Policies 
Figure 1a presents the poverty ratio for the persons older than 60 and for the whole 
population in Latin America. The poverty ratio is based on a poverty line equal to half the 
median income of the household. Figure 1b present the poverty ratio using a different 
definition of the poverty line, namely a poverty line equal to $2 a day. The equivalence 
scale we use is the OECD scale that is equal to 0.5 + 0.5 x number of adults + 0.3 x 
number of children (up to age 16).
5 
 
 With the poverty rate calculated with the OECD scale and a poverty line equal to half the 
median income, Brazil, Chili, Uruguay, Argentina (and to a lesser extent Nicaragua) have 
low  poverty  rates  comparable  to  most  OECD  countries  (below  11%).
6  These  four 
countries are often associated as having the same “mature” treatment of old age. It is 
worth noting that they do not all belong to the richest Latin American countries as one 
                                                 
5 In the appendix we present poverty rates for the population aged 65+ instead of 60+ and for per capita 
income  instead of equivalized income. 
6  These  figures  for  Latin  America  can  be  compared  with  those  for  Africa  where  the  percentage  of 
households with elderly living alone is small. Elderly with children also represent a small percentage (about 
1% in Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi).  However, households headed by the elderly are 
more frequent, ranging between 12 to 27 percent.  The incidence of poverty among elderly persons is 
generally higher than on average, and higher than among the non-elderly in 11 of the 15 countries for 
which data are available. The exceptions are Burundi, Madagascar, Mozambique and Uganda (Kakwani, 
Schwartz and Subbarao 2004). 
   7 
can see on Table A1. Mexico and Venezuela are richer than Brazil and Argentina. For the 
other 14 countries the poverty rates are quite higher and in most cases higher than for the 
rest of the population. With the US$2 a day poverty threshold the poverty rates in ABCU 
become  negligible  (<3%),  still  lower  in  old  age  than  in  the  whole  population.  In 
Nicaragua as well the poverty rate of the elderly is lower than that of the rest of the 
population, but both are high.. 
 
We draw three main conclusions from the comparison of old age poverty rates in these 
Latin American countries. First, poverty rates are consistently lower for the elderly than 
for the whole population in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile.
7 Second, in the other 
countries, the situation is heterogeneous and depends on the poverty line chosen. Using 
half  the  median  income,  Bolivia,  Columbia,  Costa  Rica,  Honduras  and  Mexico  have 
comparable overall levels of poverty in old age and the elderly are poorer than the rest of 
the population. Finally, the difference between old age and overall poverty rates is not 
very high for all countries with limited pension systems.  
 
Old age poverty is computed here using household surveys.  As pointed out by Deaton 
and Paxson (1997), when household per capita income (or expenditure) is used as the 
main welfare indicator, the assumption made about the way in which resources are shared 
in  the  family  to  which  an  elderly  belongs  affects  the  quality  of  the  estimates.  The 
assumptions made by statistical agencies can by themselves bias estimates against old age 
poverty.  As an example Deaton (1997, p. 243) cites that the “fact” that there is less 
poverty among the elderly in the United States depends on the assumption in the official 
counts that the elderly need less than adults younger than 60.  
 
Two major issues complicate the problem of obtaining poverty rates for old age. First, the 
elderly  may  often  be  living  in  households  that  are  not  that  poor  even  though  they 
themselves are not receiving any pension so that the often used implicit assumption of 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, this is not the case in Costa Rica which has a non-contributory pension scheme but with the 
least generous average benefit of the 5 Latin countries with social assistance pensions (Bertranou, Solorio 
and van Ginneken 2004).   8 
fair sharing might be invalid.
8  Second, the measurement of poverty in old age needs to 
be sensitive to the potential impact of economies of scale in household consumption on 
the  perceived  well-being  of  the  aged.  Typically  households  with  many  children  are 
deemed to be among the poorest if one does not adjust for economies of scale. Then 
pensioner  households  or  households  headed  by  widows,  etc  are  not  very  highly 
represented among the poor.
9 To illustrate the importance of equivalence scales, consider 
a society in which the elderly on average belong to family units of size 2 whereas the size 
of households without elderly is 5. Their aggregate income is respectively 5 and 10. 
Without  scale  economies,  the  elderly  income  is  2.5  and  that  of  individuals  living  in 
households without elderly is 2.  Using a standard equivalence scale (i.e., the square root 
of  family  size),  these  figures  become  3.5  and  4.4.    In  other  words,  thanks  to  the 
economies of scale, the welfare of the non-elderly families can be higher than that of 
families with elderly.  
 
                                                 
8  Traditionally equal sharing is assumed, with possibly a downward adjustment for children. Yet there is 
ample evidence to suggest that this is not the case. In the real world, we observe a wide range of situations 
ranging from the idyllic image of a family all devoted to the care of its elderly members to the more 
depressing representation of elderly being kept in the closet. The later situation has recently received a lot 
of attention in India where widows who represent a large fraction of the elderly (55% of women aged 60 
and above are widowed—see Jensen 2003) and often do not receive an equal share within the household 
(Dreze and Srinavasan 1997). There is also the case of the Tanzanian “witches” studied by Miguel (2003) 
who shows how harshly unproductive members of a family can be treated by the others. 
 
9   E c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  l i v i n g  t o g e t h e r  a n d  s h a r i n g  g o o d s  s u c h  a s  h o u s i n g ,  m e a n s  o f  
transportation, etc vary across countries, years and income levels. The extent of scale economies depend on 
the  allocation  between  private  and  public  goods  in  the  household’s  consumption  basket,  an  allocation 
which  is  endogenous  depending  on  prices  and  income.  Household  size,  age  and  gender  of  household 
members may also influence the amount of resources needed to attain a certain level of well-being. The 
consumption needs of children are usually thought as being quite lower than that of adults. To go from 
household’s resources to individual well-being, the concept of equivalent household scale is used.  For 
example, the OECD currently uses an equivalence scale equal to 0.5 + 0.5 * (number of adults) + 0.3 * 
(number of children). A household consisting of two adults and three children would need to spend 2.4 
times as much as a single adult to be equally as well off as a single adult. By contrast, in the absence of 
economies of scale and with the same needs for both children and adults, this family would need 5 time as 
much as a single adult to reach the same welfare. An alternative equivalence scale formula is simply to take 
the square root of the family size (which, in our example, would give an equivalent size of 2.2, i.e., close to 
that of the OECD). Lanjouw, Milanovic and Paternostro (1998) examine the incidence of scale economies 
on  the  poverty  rate  of  the  elderly  in  selected  transition  economies.  They  show  that,  without  scale 
economies, poverty in old age is relatively low but that it increases with scale economies and rapidly 
become more important than in younger age groups. 
   9 
In that respect it is interesting to analyze the structure of our elderly households. As it 
appears in Table A2 in the appendix, Uruguay is the country where there are the largest 
fraction (0.54) of elderly households in which elderly individuals live on their own. In 
most  OECD  countries  this  fraction  is  even  higher.  At  the  other  extreme  we  have 
Nicaragua with only 10% of elderly households consisting of only elderly individuals. In 
many  countries  children  (16-)  live  in  elderly  households.  In  Figure  2  we  distinguish 
elderly households with and without non-elderly for poverty based on half the median 
income. These two subsets are denoted EHH2 and EHH1 respectively. It appears that 
poverty is relatively higher in the first group in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and in El 
Salvador. In all the other countries poverty is higher in households made of only elderly 
individuals.  
In a number of cases the differences are huge showing the (assumed) role of family 
solidarity and the importance of the selected equivalence scale. To explore this point, as a 
thought experiment, we have posited that al the elderly individuals would live on their 
own.  More  precisely,  we  have  assumed  that  the  elderly  living  with  younger  family 
members would split and live separately on their own resources. The outcome of such a 
split is given in Figure 3. Here again we see that Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay behave 
differently from the rest. In these countries poverty is lower for elderly living on their 
own than for younger individuals.  
In this exercise we have used the pivotal age of 60 to define old age. The definition of 
what constitutes “old age” needs to be defined in relationship to longevity. Mortality has 
been  rapidly  declining  over  the  last  50  years  but  there  are  great  variations  across 
countries and over time. All things being equal, average income and poverty levels for 
individuals  above  60  are  clearly  different  if  life  expectancy  is  78,  as  in  developed 
countries, or 46 as in African countries. If the same cut-off age is chosen for all countries 
(say 60 or 65), there is a serious selection bias in the group of people above 60 for 
countries  where  longevity  is  46.    However  the  comparison  between  rich  and  poor 
countries may be seriously flawed because the main reason why life expectancy at birth is 
low in poor countries is child mortality. 
   10 
Another difficulty comes from the relation between the pivotal age and the retirement age 
(i.e., the mandatory age at which workers have to stop working and/or the age at which 
retirees  start  benefiting  from  a  pension).  The  rate  of  labor  participation,  formal  or 
informal, above 60 varies significantly across countries and this depends in larger part on 
existing social security schemes.  This is the reason why the appendix reports results for 
the alternative cut-off age of 65. Table A3 compares the poverty rates for elderly 60+ 
versus  elderly  65+.  In  most  countries  poverty  is  slightly  higher  with  65+  except  in 
ABCU, Bolivia, Ecuador and Panama. 
 


















Argentina  0.21  0.33  0.13  0.55 
Bolivia  0.23  0.31  0.29  0.52 
Brazil  0.22  0.33  0.06  0.52 
Chile  0.16  0.23  0.15  0.39 
Colombia  0.24  0.29  0.31  0.47 
Costa Rica  0.18  0.22  0.32  0.48 
DR  0.18  0.27  0.22  0.41 
Ecuador  0.19  0.25  0.25  0.39 
El 
Salvador 
0.17  0.29  0.17  0.43 
Guatemala  0.22  0.3  0.24  0.35 
Honduras  0.28  0.39  0.31  0.52 
Mexico  0.19  0.24  0.28  0.43 
Nicaragua  0.2  0.25  0.17  0.29 
Panama  0.23  0.34  0.23  0.51 
Paraguay  0.23  0.3  0.23  0.41 
Peru  0.21  0.24  0.23  0.3 
Uruguay  0.17  0.33  0.08  0.51 
Venezuela  0.18  0.24  0.21  0.38 
 
OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios. The 
poverty line is ½ of the national median per capita income 
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Poverty Rates without Transfers 
Table 2 compares poverty rates (headcount ratios based on a ½ median income poverty 
line) in those 18 Latin American countries for the elderly.  The first columns show the 
poverty rates under the actual situation and the second set of columns the poverty rates 
without transfers. Computations are shown for both the elderly and the whole population. 
 
One observes that the incidence of social transfers is clear particularly when the post 
transfer poverty rate is low: Argentina's poverty rate falls from around 55 to 13 percent. 
Brazil’s rate falls from 52 to 6% and Uruguay’s rate from 51 to 8%. In general, however, 
the reduction in poverty rates is less important than in OECD countries for an obvious 
reason: with rare exceptions there are no pension systems in Latin American particularly 
aimed at reducing poverty among poor old people. 
 
Simulating the Impact of Minimum Pensions 
This section presents the results of a micro-simulation exercise consisting in introducing 
a minimum pension in 18 Latin American countries. following Atkinson et al. (2002). 
We are concerned by two questions: how much minimum pension schemes would cost 
and  how  much  poverty  would  they  permit  eradicating  in  Latin  American  countries. 
Answer  to  both  questions  clearly  depends  on  the  particular  design  of  the  minimum 
pension that is selected.  We present here 2 possible schemes given a target minimum 
income of z. Let y denote the non public pension income of elderly and p their current 
public pensions plus social transfers. In other words private pensions, if any, are part of y. 
Furthermore, we take z as equal to the poverty line. 
 
1)  Unconditional topping-up:  Elderly transfer guaranteeing poverty line income to all 
individuals aged x or more:  
T = Max (0. z-p)     if Age > x.   
          
2)  Conditional  topping-up:    Elderly  means-tested  transfer  guaranteeing  poverty  line 
income  
T =  Max (0. z-p-y)  if Age > x.     12 
 
The first scheme thus implies a uniform minimum pension and the second a variable one, 
which depends on households’ resources. We briefly discuss the importance of the key 
parameters of these formulas. 
Age.    For  contributory  pensions,  the  eligibility  age  is  part  of  the  financial  constraint 
conceived individually or collectively. But in the case of noncontributory pensions there 
is some arbitrariness to determine at what age a person without any resource and any 
employment  history  suddenly  is  entitled  to  a  transfer.    The  eligibility  age  should  be 
determined by the capacity of the pensioner to work or not. It should thus be a function of 
health and of longevity. Given the level of benefits, the length of the entitlement—i.e., 
the  difference  between  life  expectancy  and  the  age  chosen—is  what  matters  for  the 
revenue constraint.  Traditionally the retirement age tends to be lower for women than for 
men even though lately one witnesses harmonization (always towards the higher age) 
driven by gender equality and budget constraint considerations. We report simulation 
results for two definitions of “old age”: 60 and older. and 65 and older (in the appendix).  
Means Test. Since the objective is to reduce poverty in old age, the only meaningful 
choice is between an unconditional minimum pension and a conditional (i.e., means-
tested) pension. A minimum pension guarantee which covers only workers with some 
minimal career would exclude too many people. An unconditional pension has a number 
of advantages: it is administratively simpler; it implies less disincentives to work and 
save; and it carries less stigma. It is however costlier though there is the possibility of 
taxing those who do not really need it but this then creates some unwanted administrative 
costs: testing means or taxing those who don’t need the pension are formally similar. 
Therefore, a priori, an unconditional pension would cost more than a conditional one but 
would be more attractive. The choice boils down to questions of financial feasibility and, 
above all, political support. If there are strong revenue constraints, it might be desirable 
to introduce other types of conditionality. For example, in Mexico, the uniform pension is 
offered in the Federal District to those known to be the poorest. In Brazil, the uniform 
pension (which is means tested) is restricted to rural areas. 
Level of Benefits.  It is reasonable to set the level of benefits latter as a function of an 
indicator of poverty such as the minimum wage or the poverty line. The benefit could be   13 
in cash or in nature. When there is a risk that the pension would not reach the elderly and 
when the pension is likely to be very small. it might be preferable to provide benefits 
such  as  food  or  health  stamps  than  cash.  Here  we  have  decided  to  take  the  poverty 
threshold as a benefit target. 
Fiscal Cost.  To approximate the cost of providing a minimum rate pension. we use the 
revenue constraint 
tEY = ET 
where t is the contribution rate;  Y. the individual income; and T. the level of minimum 
pension. We use the operator E as a short for the sum over all the individuals concerned. 
The feasibility of our minimum pension scheme will clearly depend on the level of t, that 
is the fraction of mean income that is needed to finance it.. 
 
Incentive Effects of Minimum Pensions 
Minimum pensions are expected to have disincentive effects on individual decisions and 
on the economic and social behavior of households which policy design needs to take 
into  account.  in  particular.  how  pensions  are  shared  within  the  family  unit  and  their 
incidence on the labor supply of the members of the family. These incentive effects will 
not be taken into account. To do so we would need behavioral microsimulations, which 
are  out  of  the  scope  of  this  paper.  Let  us  however  mention  the  various  behavioral 
reactions one can expect from minimum pensions schemes..  
Retirement Decision. In developed countries. low rates of activity among elderly workers 
and  low  effective  age  of  retirement  threaten  the  financial  viability  of  social  security 
systems by generating. in conjunction with increasing longevity. high dependency ratios 
(Gruber and Wise 1999).  The availability of a minimum pension at an early age is a 
factor  explaining  early  retirement.  For  developing  countries.  a  low  rate  of  labor 
participation in old age is less of an issue.  The problem can be avoided by choosing an 
entitlement age that is not too low.  Comparing means-tested and unconditional minimum 
pension schemes. the former one will induce retirement earlier than the latter to the extent 
that it includes an earnings test. 
Prodigality Effect. In the presence of a minimum pension. some individuals who would 
otherwise have saved for retirement could be tempted to reach retirement without any   14 
resources trusting that they are entitled to some minimal protection. These individuals. 
labeled “rational prodigals” in the literature. have to be induced to save by making the 
minimum  pension  less  attractive.  However.  by  doing  so  in  a  world  of  asymmetric 
information. one penalizes people who really depend on the minimum pension because 
they are unable to accumulate enough resources for retirement. The prodigality argument 
was introduced by Hayek (1960. p. 286) who advocated an old age pension whose raison 
d’être “is not that people should be coerced to do what is in their individual interest but 
that by neglecting to make provisions. they would become a charge to the public. Up to 
this point the justification for the whole apparatus of ‘social security’ can probably be 
accepted by the most consistent defenders of liberty.” 
10  
Mobility.    The  incidence  of  a  minimum  rate  pension  when  workers  are  mobile  is 
ambiguous. From the tax competition literature. we know that it will attract low income 
retirees from less generous neighboring countries. This will have the effect of pushing 
down these pensions and of resulting in what is often called a race to the bottom. At the 
same time. the insurance of obtaining a minimum pension regardless of one’s career can 
induce mobility within a country. 
Longevity.  As already mentioned. dependency ratios are lower in developing countries 
because longevity is lower. which limits the fiscal cost of a minimum pension. but the 
trend in developing countries is toward an increase in dependency ratios as a result of 
increased longevity and declining fertility (Wolfensohn and Bourguignon 2004, p.26). 
The cost of minimum pension programs will thus increase. At the same time. minimum 
pensions would induce by themselves an increase in longevity since they would provide 
the elderly with better food and health care. Even in societies where transfers like these 
minimum pensions are “confiscated” by other members of the extended family. there are 
incentives to keep the beneficiaries alive and well as long as possible. 
Weakening Family Ties. In developing countries, elderly people often live within a rather 
extended family and. in the absence of pensions. they rely on younger generations to 
provide  them  food  and  care.  These  types  of  arrangements  have  been  studied  by 
                                                 
10 Along the same lines, it is worth pointing out that a minimum pension can affect financial risk taking. In 
countries with individualized accounts and retirement money invested in the stock market, middle and low 
income workers may have a strong incentive to choose a portfolio with high risk and high return profiles as 
they can always be bailed out . 
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sociologists. anthropologists and more recently by economists (Barrientos, Gorman and 
Heslop 2003).  The mechanisms underlying these family arrangements range from pure 
altruism.  to  cooperative  or  strategic  exchange.  to  social  pressure.    One  hypothesis—
known  as  the  old  age  security  hypothesis—linking  social  security  with  fertility  and 
family solidarity goes as follows: in the absence of social security. parents depend on 
their children to give them care and attention in their old age and. thus. tend to have many 
children.  As societies develop. social security institutions appear. and children are much 
less needed as sources of support in old age: fertility falls and family links distend. 
Since  we  are  interested  to  find  out  what  impact  a  minimum  pension  would  have  on 
poverty in old age. the relevant question is how the additional resource represented by 
this transfer would be used by the elderly living in an extended household.  The key issue 
is whether or not they will benefit. at least in part. from their pension. Some family 
structures  in  Africa  and  in  Asia  care  for  the  elderly  but  restrict  their  needs  to  the 
minimum.
11 In such situations. a minimum pension would. de facto. be confiscated away 
from the elderly and miss its intended objective.  
Spillover Effects.  In general one expects a more equitable allocation of resources within 
the extended family to result from transfers of this type. with interesting consequences 
arising from minimum pensions. The case of South Africa is interesting in this regard. 
Women turning 60 and men turning 65 become eligible for a pension roughly equal to 
twice the per capita income of black Africans in South Africa. The cash transfer had a 
double effect.  First. it resulted in a drop in labor supply of prime-age individuals living 
with these elderly. particularly when the pensioner is a woman (Bertrand. Mullainathan 
and  Miller  2003).  See  also  Jakubowicz  2004  for  the  case  of  rural  Brazil.  Second  it 
resulted  in  improved  health  of  the  granddaughters  when  the  grandmother  is  the 
beneficiary (Duflo 2003). These results show the type of ‘arbitrage’ that can be observed 
in  an  extended  family.  The  role  played  by  women  is  also  striking.  These  minimum 
pensions have positive spillovers for other members of the extended family. Carvalho 
(2001)  has  studied  the  effect  on  labor  outcomes  and  school  enrollment  of  children 
residing with the beneficiaries of the pensions awarded to rural workers in Brazil. They 
show  that  these  old  age  benefits  foster  school  enrollment  and  decrease  child  labor 
                                                 
11  See footnote 9.  Dreze and Srinavasan (1997) and Miguel (2003)     16 
participation; they also show that the intensity of these effects depends on the gender of 
the beneficiaries and of the children concerned.  
 
Simulation Results for 18 Latin American Countries 
We  now  turn  to  the  results  of  our  “mechanical”  (as  opposed  to  behavioral) 
microsimulations using household survey data for 18 Latin America countries for the 
latest  available  year.  The  surveys  give  us  the  disposable  income  (resources)  and  the 
family structure for aged people. We use two alternatives definitions of old age: 60 and 
65 (the latter in the appendix). The disposable income is the sum of all the resources 
available  in  the  family  unit  to  which  the  elderly  person(s)  belong(s)  divided  by  the 
equivalence scale. The simulation consists in introducing a minimum pension equal to the 
poverty rate. This pension is given to all elderly granted they do not receive any other 
transfers from the government. If they do. the new pension is adjusted accordingly. We 
consider two scheme depending on whether or not the minimum pension is means tested, 
the means being the resources of the elderly concerned. 
In the simulations. we use two specifications for the minimum pension  US$2 a day or 
50% of median income. We are interested in measuring the impact on the poverty rate 
and the fiscal cost of this minimum pension. Clearly since the minimum pension is aimed 
at reaching the poverty line, if all elderly would live by themselves, poverty in old age 
would  disappear.  Poverty  will  only  remain  because  a  majority  of  elderly  live  with 
younger family members with whom they share all the available resources. Consequently 
results will depend on the equivalence scale and on the structure of the family where the 
elderly people live.  
The results are presented in figures 5 and 6 for the two levels of poverty. These figures 
show the decrease in poverty rates due to the two types of schemes. Not surprisingly the 
decline in poverty is higher when there is no means test. In that case, some elderly end up 
with  an  income  higher  than  the  poverty  line  and  this  can  be  shared  among  all  the 
members of the households. Let us repeat that if all elderly were living on their own, 
poverty would disappear under the two schemes,  
   17 
The cost of the two schemes. 
It might be useful to relate the cost of our minimum pension scheme to the concept of 
poverty gap, that is the amount relative to the poverty line that has to be transferred to the 
poor families to bring their incomes up to the poverty threshold. In other words the 
poverty gap give the relative amount of resources that one needs to eradicate poverty. If 
we measure the poverty gap for the population of elderly and if we assume that all the 
elderly live alone, the poverty gap and the cost of a minimum pension with means testing 
would coincide.
12 
Figures 5a and b give the cost of the minimum pension expressed here as a fraction of 
personal  income.
13  The  cost  is  high  when  the  poverty  line  (and  thus  the  minimum 
pension)  is  based  on  50%  of  median  income—which  is  also  the  minimum  pension 
scheme that is the most efficient at lowering poverty. The highest cost  is for Ecuador and 
Mexico.  It is naturally higher when there is no means test.  The cost depends on the share 
of old persons in the total population; on the average income of old households relative to 
the median; and on the presence or not of transfers (the minimum pension policy will be 
more expensive if there are no transfers to start with). 
 
 
Conclusions   
The keystone idea of this paper is that  societies are rightfully judged on the way they treat their elderly 
and particularly their poor elderly and that the best way to alleviate poverty in old age is through a 
scheme of basic pensions. We applied this idea to a set of 18 Latin American countries. The main 
conclusion we draw is that minimum pensions lead to a very substantial reduction in poverty and that in 
general their cost is reasonable. Not surprisingly both the effect and the cost of such a scheme 
drastically vary with the type of poverty threshold chosen. Relative to half the median income a USk$2 
a day pension costs less. This is particularly true in richer countries as the half the median income 
approach is relative and a $2 a day pension seems negligible in those countries. 
                                                 
12 Table A3 presents the poverty gap index for the whole population and for the population of elderly. The 
poverty gap index is the ratio of the difference between the poverty level and the actual non pension 
income of the poor  over  the poverty line. The  relative cost of the means  test scheme is the ratio of the 
difference between  the poverty line and  the  actual non pension income  over the average income 
13 To express the fiscal cost as a share of GDP the figures would need to be multiplied by a factor of 0.5 to 
0.7.   18 
Tables 3a and b  summarize some of the key results.  With half the median income the relative reduction 
ranges from 17% in Columbia to 75% in Costa Rica.  The absolute reduction ranges from 2% in Brazil 
to 24% in Costa Rica. As to the relative cost, it ranges from 0.1% to 2.9% in Columbia. Columbia is a 
particular case. The minimum pension there costs a lot and yet it has a very small effect, both relative 
(0.168) and absolute (0.05). This puzzling result is due to the family structure: we should remember that 
if all elderly would live on themselves poverty would eradicate. Poverty remains because the minimum 
pension is diluted among non-elderly household members. 
With a $2 a day the absolute reduction in poverty ranges from a negligible amount in Chile and Uruguay 
to 11% in Columbia. The relative reduction ranges from 16% in Nicaragua to 80% in Argentina. Not 
surprisingly the cost is lower. It is negligible in Brazil, Chile and reaches a maximum of 1.5% in 
Columbia. 
Finally, let us address two key questions. Are those schemes financially affordable and politically 
sustainable? The affordability depends on which threshold we choose, $2 a day or half the median 
income, and on the level of national income. As a rule of thumb we would say that countries with 
national income above the Latin American average could and should opt for a minimum pension equal 
to half the median income. For the others, a $2 a day pension is reasonable. It is interesting to consider 
the countries that are relatively richer than the other: ABCU, Mexico and Venezuela. It is clear that a 
minimum pension equal to half the median income seems to be more desirable in these latter two 
countries where the rate of poverty is higher and the reduction (12% in both countries) substantial.  
If we turn to the poorest countries, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay, a $2 minimum pension 
will have clear effects but with a cost ranging from 1.1% to 0.3%, which seems affordable. It is worth 
noticing that Bolivia that has a quasi universal pension scheme keeps a quite high poverty rate among 
elderly. This naturally comes from the fact that the existing scheme provides benefits that are quite 
below the poverty line based on $2 a day. 
The final question is that of political sustainability. Even if such pension scheme is adopted there is 
always the risk to see it progressively eroded because of lack of political will. Elderly people 
particularly in developing countries do not have a big political weight. Relative to OECD countries their 
demographic importance is small. To the extent that the majority of elderly live with their children they 
cannot express their concerns truly independently. For these reasons it is important to give the minimum 
pension scheme a constitutional status and a frame that makes it adjust to social or economic changing 
parameters. For example the age at which the pension is made available could vary with longevity.   19 
Benefits should not be absolute but be linked to national income growth. One can imagine that with high 
inflation depreciation of the US currency a $2 a day pension quickly loses its attractiveness. 
 
The  exercise  conducted  in  our  paper  could  cover  a  number  of  other  specifications 
pertaining to the age of entitlement (60. 65. the same for men and women?). the nature of 
transfers (cash or in kind). the conditionality (schooling of grand-children). It is very 
likely that the results would not change much and that priority should be given to the 
issue of implementation.   20 
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Table 3a Summary of results: Poverty reduction among the elderly with means-tested minimum 
pensions 





























Argentina  0.13  0.09  0.685  0.019  0.012 
Bolivia  0.29  0.17  0.597  0.012  0.007 
Brazil  0.06  0.01  0.198  0.001  0 
Chile  0.15  0.05  0.369  0.006  0.005 
Colombia  0.31  0.15  0.48  0.029  0.02 
Costa Rica  0.32  0.24  0.738  0.021  0.016 
DR  0.22  0.13  0.621  0.019  0.014 
Ecuador  0.25  0.1  0.402  0.009  0.007 
El 
Salvador 
0.17  0.11  0.656  0.024  0.018 
Guatemala  0.24  0.08  0.347  0.007  0.005 
Honduras  0.31  0.16  0.508  0.017  0.013 
Mexico  0.28  0.12  0.405  0.009  0.007 
Nicaragua  0.17  0.02  0.133  0.005  0.003 
Panama  0.23  0.15  0.643  0.018  0.013 
Paraguay  0.23  0.14  0.591  0.019  0.014 
Peru  0.23  0.15  0.633  0.022  0.016 
Uruguay  0.08  0.05  0.709  0.017  0.011 
Venezuela  0.21  0.12  0.581  0.023  0.016 
OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios.  
 
Table 3b Summary of results: Poverty reduction among the elderly with means-tested minimum 
pensions 





























Argentina  0.03  0.02  0.796  0.006  0.004 
Bolivia  0.17  0.09  0.523  0.006  0.003 
Brazil  0.01  0.01  0.526  0  0   21 
Chile  0  0  0.348  0  0 
Colombia  0.22  0.11  0.504  0.015  0.011 
Costa Rica  0.07  0.05  0.72  0.004  0.003 
DR  0.02  0.01  0.514  0.005  0.004 
Ecuador  0.13  0.06  0.423  0.003  0.003 
El 
Salvador 
0.1  0.07  0.658  0.017  0.013 
Guatemala  0.08  0.03  0.365  0.002  0.002 
Honduras  0.21  0.11  0.5  0.011  0.008 
Mexico  0.15  0.08  0.536  0.003  0.003 
Nicaragua  0.12  0.02  0.16  0.003  0.002 
Panama  0.06  0.05  0.722  0.005  0.003 
Paraguay  0.1  0.07  0.661  0.01  0.008 
Peru  0.12  0.08  0.648  0.011  0.008 
Uruguay  0  0  0.679  0.003  0.002 
Venezuela  0.1  0.05  0.51  0.011  0.008 
 
OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios.   22 
 
 
Notes: In this and the following figures, households are defined as follows: NEHH is a household with no elderly members. EHH is a household with at least one 
elderly member. EHH households are divided into two subsets, namely EHH1 (elderly living alone by themselves) and EHH2 (consisting of both elderly and 
non-elderly members).  23   24   25 
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Argentina  2006  5,140  344  229  75  0.21 
Bolivia  2007  1,220  239  132  66  0.23 
Brazil  2006  4,820  337  186  72  0.22 
Chile  2006  6,890  464  272  78  0.16 
Colombia  2004  2,500  156  85  72  0.24 
Costa Rica  2006  5,030  340  216  79  0.18 
DR  2006  3,390  278  165  72  0.18 
Ecuador  2006  2,920  263  154  75  0.19 
El 
Salvador 
2006  2,980  221  152  71  0.17 
Guatemala  2006  2,250  208  124  70  0.22 
Honduras  2007  1,590  175  96  70  0.28 
Mexico  2002  6,000  244  151  74  0.19 
Nicaragua  2005  890  151  92  72  0.2 
Panama  2006  4,940  303  175  75  0.23 
Paraguay  2005  1,240  253  148  71  0.23 
Peru  2006  2,930  222  144  73  0.21 
Uruguay  2007  6,620  410  276  76  0.17 
Venezuela  2006  6,120  239,675  172852  73  0.18 
OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios. The poverty line is ½ of the national median per capita income.  36 
Table A2 Household size & structure 
 
Country	 ﾠ  Mean	 ﾠ



















Argentina	 ﾠ 3.4	 ﾠ 0.32	 ﾠ 0.46	 ﾠ
Bolivia	 ﾠ 4.05	 ﾠ 0.24	 ﾠ 0.31	 ﾠ
Brazil	 ﾠ 3.18	 ﾠ 0.23	 ﾠ 0.32	 ﾠ
Chile	 ﾠ 3.65	 ﾠ 0.39	 ﾠ 0.3	 ﾠ
Colombia	 ﾠ 4.04	 ﾠ 0.3	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ
Costa	 ﾠRica	 ﾠ 3.74	 ﾠ 0.25	 ﾠ 0.31	 ﾠ
DR	 ﾠ 3.74	 ﾠ 0.27	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ
Ecuador	 ﾠ 4.22	 ﾠ 0.33	 ﾠ 0.29	 ﾠ
El	 ﾠSalvador	 ﾠ 4.18	 ﾠ 0.31	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ
Guatemala	 ﾠ 5.02	 ﾠ 0.25	 ﾠ 0.19	 ﾠ
Honduras	 ﾠ 4.62	 ﾠ 0.27	 ﾠ 0.15	 ﾠ
Mexico	 ﾠ 4.2	 ﾠ 0.25	 ﾠ 0.27	 ﾠ
Nicaragua	 ﾠ 5.32	 ﾠ 0.28	 ﾠ 0.1	 ﾠ
Panama	 ﾠ 3.79	 ﾠ 0.3	 ﾠ 0.29	 ﾠ
Paraguay	 ﾠ 4.3	 ﾠ 0.29	 ﾠ 0.24	 ﾠ
Peru	 ﾠ 4.5	 ﾠ 0.32	 ﾠ 0.24	 ﾠ
Uruguay	 ﾠ 2.91	 ﾠ 0.41	 ﾠ 0.54	 ﾠ
Venezuela	 ﾠ 4.3	 ﾠ 0.26	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ
Elderly are HH members aged >=60 years. Column 1 is the mean number of HH 
members in ALL households. Column 2 is #EHH/#AHH. Column 3 is #EHH1/#EHH 
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Argentina  0.21  0.24  0.13  0.11  0.12 
Bolivia  0.23  0.24  0.29  0.19  0.26 
Brazil  0.22  0.25  0.06  0.06  0.05 
Chile  0.16  0.18  0.15  0.11  0.15 
Colombia  0.24  0.24  0.31  0.29  0.33 
Costa Rica  0.18  0.2  0.32  0.25  0.36 
DR  0.18  0.2  0.22  0.17  0.22 
Ecuador  0.19  0.21  0.25  0.21  0.27 
El 
Salvador 
0.17  0.19  0.17  0.14  0.19 
Guatemala  0.22  0.24  0.24  0.19  0.26 
Honduras  0.28  0.28  0.31  0.26  0.32 
Mexico  0.19  0.21  0.28  0.25  0.3 
Nicaragua  0.2  0.22  0.17  0.15  0.17 
Panama  0.23  0.25  0.23  0.19  0.24 
Paraguay  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.17  0.26 
Peru  0.21  0.22  0.23  0.17  0.25 
Uruguay  0.17  0.21  0.08  0.05  0.07 
Venezuela  0.18  0.2  0.21  0.18  0.23 
For estimates using the OECD adjusted HH size, the poverty line is ½ of the national 
median per capita OECD adjusted income. For estimates using unadjusted HH sizes, the 
poverty line is ½ of the national median per capita income.  38 
 








Argentina  0.09  0.06 
Bolivia  0.1  0.12 
Brazil  0.09  0.02 
Chile  0.05  0.04 
Colombia  0.14  0.21 
Costa Rica  0.07  0.15 
DR  0.06  0.07 
Ecuador  0.07  0.12 
El 
Salvador 
0.06  0.06 
Guatemala  0.08  0.09 
Honduras  0.15  0.16 
Mexico  0.08  0.15 
Nicaragua  0.07  0.05 
Panama  0.11  0.11 
Paraguay  0.09  0.09 
Peru  0.08  0.1 
Uruguay  0.05  0.02 
Venezuela  0.08  0.11 
OECD adjusted HH sizes with a poverty line of ½ of the national median per capita 
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